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AIDS AS A HANDICAP UNDER THE FEDERAL
REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973
The number of reported cases of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) in the United States has continued to climb steadily each year since
the United States Centers for Disease Control' officially reported the first
cases of patients with symptoms of AIDS in June 1981.2 The medical research
community has documented the effects of the disease thoroughly.3 The
primary clinical symptom of AIDS is the severe suppression of the immune
system. 4 As a result of the breakdown of the immune system, opportunistic
infections and cancers, unchecked by certain antibodies normally produced
by the immune system, attack the body of an AIDS victim.5 The opportunistic
1. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL -1984/85 at 273 (1984). The Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare established the Centers for Disease Control in 1973 and charged
the agency with protecting the public health of the Nation. Id. The Centers for Disease Control
provide leadership and direction in the prevention and control of diseases and in the response
to public health emergencies. Id. In 1981, the Centers for Disease Control established a task
force to determine risk factors, to conduct laboratory studies, and to disseminate timely
information on AIDS. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
REPORTS ON AIDS (cover acknowledgments) (1985).
2. Foege, The National Pattern of AIDS, in THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 7 (K. Cahill ed. 1983).
The United States Centers for Disease Control first reported the occurrence of opportunistic
infections in five homosexual males, all of whom showed evidence of defective immune systems,
in Spring 1981. Pneumocystic Pneumonia-Los Angeles, reprinted in Centers for Disease
Control, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Reports on AIDS, 1, 1-2.(1985). The five patients
suffered from the disease now known as AIDS. Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
(AIDS)-United States, reprinted in Centers for Disease Control, Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., Reports on AIDS, 49, 49 (1985). Medical researchers now believe that American
physicians treated patients with AIDS symptoms before 1981. Id. Data for the time period
before the first officially reported case of AIDS in 1981 are based on reports from individual
physicians and health departments. Foege, The National Pattern of Aids, THE AIDS EPIDEMIC
8 (K. Cahill ed. 1983). The incidence of AIDS in the United States has doubled every six months
between the second half of 1979 and 1983. Id. at 10-12. Physicians have reported more new
cases of AIDS in 1985 than the previous six years during which the medical community first
documented the disease. AIDS Cases in 1985 Exceed Total of All Previous Years, Washington
Post, Jan. 17, 1985, at Al, col. 4 [hereinafter cited as AIDS Cases in 1985]. The length of time
that it takes for the number of reported AIDS cases to double, however, has decreased. Id.
3. See generally CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
REPORTS ON AIDS (1985) (containing 70 articles related to AIDS published by Centers for
Disease Control from June 1981 through September 1985). The New England Journal of
Medicine has published over 35 articles on AIDS-related topics in the first half of 1985 alone.
312 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1680b (1985) (subject index).
4. AIDS Virology: A Battle on Many Fronts, Sci., Nov. 1, 1985, at 519 [hereinafter
cited as AIDS Virology]; see infra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing method by which
AIDS virus suppresses immune system).
5. See Comment, AIDS: A Legal Epidemic?, 17 AKRON L. REV. 717, 718-23 (1984)
(summarizing medical history of AIDS through 1983). The primary symptom of AIDS is a
sharp drop in the number of T cells, the blood cells that are crucial to the body's ability to
respond to infectious agents invading the body. AIDS Virology, supra note 4, at 519. AIDS
victims are vulnerable to serious, often fatal, opportunistic diseases, including Kaposi's sarcoma,
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diseases and cancers eventually prove fatal.6 Although medical research-
ers recently have discovered the virus that causes AIDS, 7 a cure for the
disease continues to elude the medical community.8 The public's fear of
contracting AIDS has continued to grow because medical evidence shows
that the disease, once thought to strike only the high-risk groups of
homosexual males, intravenous drug users, and hemophiliacs, may strike
individuals outside of the three high-risk groups.9 In spite of the medi-
a rare form of skin cancer, and Pneumocystic carinii, a parasitic infection of the lungs. See
Safai, Kaposi's Sarcoma, in THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 98-112 (K. Cahill ed. 1983) (discussing outbreak
of Kaposi's sarcoma in AIDS patients); Cahill, Parasitic Infections, in THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 86-
97 (K. Cahill ed. 1983). The virus that causes AIDS, the HTLV-III/LAV virus, multiplies in T
cells, particularly in a subclass of T cells known as T4 cells, killing the T cells in the process.
AIDS Virology, supra note 4, at 521. A sharp decrease in the number of T4 cells results in the
collapse of the immune system. Id. at 519.
6. AIDS Cases in 1985, supra note 2, at Al, col. 4. Most AIDS patients die approximately
fifteen months after doctors diagnose the disease. Id. As of April 30, 1985, 49% of the adults
and 69% of the children reported to have contracted AIDS have died. Update: Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome-United States, reprinted in Centers for Disease Control, Dep't
of Health & Human Servs., Reports on AIDS, 90, 90 (1985). Seventy five percent of AIDS
patients diagnosed before January 1983 have died. Id.
7. See AIDS Virology, supra note 4, at 518 (research at National Cancer Institute firmly
implicates new virus as cause of AIDS). The virus that causes AIDS is the human T-lymphotropic
virus type III (HTLV-III), lymphadenopathy-associated virus (LAV), or AIDS-associated retro-
virus (ARV). Id. at 521; see Provisional Public Health Service Inter-Agency Recommendations
for Screening Donated Blood and Plasma for Antibody to the Virus Causing Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome, reprinted in Centers for Disease Control, Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., Reports on AIDS, 75, 75 (1985). The Centers for Disease Control usually refer
to the virus at HTLV-III/LAV. See Revision of the Case Definition of Acquired Immunodefi-
ciency Syndrome for National Reporting-United States, reprinted in Centers for Disease
Control, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Reports on AIDS, 95, 95-6 (1985) (referring to virus
causing AIDS as HTLV-III/LAV). The Centers for Disease Control recently have updated the
definition of AIDS in light of the discovery of the HTLV-III/LAV virus. Id. at 96. The Centers
for Disease Control currently define AIDS victims as persons whose "clinical manifestations of
HTLV-III/LAV infection may be directly attributable to infection with this virus or the result
of secondary conditions occurring as a consequence of immune dysfunction caused by the
underlying infection with HTLV-III/LAV." Id.; see id. (discussing refinements to general case
definition of AIDS adopted by Centers for Disease Control); infra note 7 (discussing HTLV-
III/LAV virus).
8. See Results of Gallup Poll on Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-New York
City, United States, 1985, reprinted in Centers for Disease Control, Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., Reports on AIDS, 104, 104 (1985) (noting unavailability of vaccine or specific therapy
for treatment of AIDS). At the present time, no cure for AIDS exists, although treatments for
the opportunistic diseases that commonly afflict AIDS patients are available. AMERICAN MAN-
AGEMENT ASSOCIATION, AIDS, THE WORKPLACE ISSUEs 72 (1985). Furthermore, researchers are
uncertain whether they can develop a vaccine that effectively will prevent an individual from
contracting AIDS. Id. at 76.
9. See Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Update-United States, reprinted
in Centers for Disease Control, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Reports on AIDS 37, 37
(1985). AIDS is not a disease exclusive to homosexuals, intravenous drug users, and hemophil-
iacs. Id. AIDS patients include infants and heterosexuals. Id.; see Comment, supra note 5, at
720-22 (AIDS has spread to most segments of population).
Until 1985, the Centers for Disease Control included persons born in Haiti and now living
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cal community's assurances that the transmission of AIDS occurs only by
the transfer of semen, blood, and possibly saliva and tears into the
bloodstream of another person, 0 and not by casual contact," the public
in the United States along with the high risk groups of homosexual males, intravenous drug
users, and hemophiliacs. Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-United States, re-
printed in Centers for Disease Control, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Reports on AIDS,
90, 92 (1985). The Centers for Disease Control now place Haitian-born AIDS patients into the
"other/unknown" high risk category. Id. The Centers for Disease Control discontinued the
separate category for Haitian-born patients now living in the United States in light of information
that both heterosexual contact and exposure to contaminated needles not associated with drug
abuse play a role in the transmission of AIDS. Id.
10. Recommendations for Preventing Possible Transmission of Human T-Lymphotropic
Virus Type III/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus from Tears, reprinted in Centers for Disease
Control, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Reports on AIDS, 109, 109-10 (1985). Researchers
have found HTLV-III, the virus that causes AIDS, in the blood, semen, saliva, and tears of
AIDS patients. Id. at 109. All secretions and excretions from an AIDS victim may contain
lymphocytes, host cells for HTLV-III. Id. at 110. The body fluids of an AIDS victim, therefore,
may yield the AIDS virus. Id. Researchers, however, have not documented the transmission of
the AIDS virus through saliva and tears. Education and Foster Care of Children Infected with
Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus, reprinted in Cen-
ters for Disease Control, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Reports on AIDS, 106, 107 (1985).
Researchers have identified no person-to-person transmission of AIDS other than through sexual
contact and injection of blood. Id.; see Prevention of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS): Report of Inter-Agency Recommendations, reprinted in Centers for Disease Control,
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Reports on AIDS, 32, 33 (1985). The mother of a two-year
old child infected with the AIDS virus, however, became infected after repeated contact with
the child's blood and body fluids while caring for the child at home. Baby Infects Mother with
AIDS Virus, The Washington Post, Feb. 7, 1986, at A4, col. I. This is the first case in the
United States in which an individual became infected with the AIDS virus through external
contact with blood or contaminated body fluids, rather than by injection of blood or by sexual
contact. Id. English researchers, however, have reported a case similar to the mother's
contraction of AIDS. Id. The Centers for Disease Control commented that contracting AIDS
through external contact is unusual and in no way represents some kind of casual contact
transmission. Id.
11. See Recommendations for Preventing Possible Transmission of Human T-Lympho-
tropic Virus Type IlI-Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus from Tears, reprinted in Centers for
Disease Control, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Reports on AIDS, 109, 110 (1985).
Researchers have found no evidence indicating the transmission of AIDS by household or casual
contact. Id. Casual or household contact includes dwelling in the same physical environment of
another person, touching, hugging, or wearing clothing another person has worn or touched,
breathing in the same area as a person who has coughed or sneezed, exposing skin surfaces to
those of another person, or eating food that another person has prepared or touched. AMERICAN
MANAGEMENT AssocIATION, AIDS, THE WORKPLACE IssuEs 68 (1985). The Montefiore Medical
Center in Bronx, New York, in cooperation with the Centers for Disease Control, recently
completed the largest and most thorough study to date of members of the families of AIDS
victims. Family Contact Fails to Spread AIDS, Roanoke Times & World-News, Feb. 6, 1986,
at AI0, col. 1, 3 [hereinafter cited as Family Contact]. The study examined the extent to which
family members hugged, kissed, and shared toothbrushes, drinking glasses, beds, towels, and
toilets with AIDS victims. Id. at col. 1. The research team leader stated that the study provides
conclusive evidence that AIDS does not spread through close day-to-day contact. Id. According
to the research leader, the results of the study, in combination with other evidence, indicate
that the risk of transmitting AIDS through household contact is "virtually nonexistent." Id.
The risk of transmitting AIDS by casual contact, therefore, is unlikely. Id.
19861 1517
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remains fearful of casual contact with AIDS victims.'2
As a result of the widespread public fear of contracting AIDS and the
knowledge that no cure for the disease exists, AIDS victims, and those
perceived as potential AIDS victims, are experiencing discrimination in all
areas of their lives, including in employment opportunities. 3 Employers
often dismiss an employee because the employee has contracted AIDS.
4
Legal commentators and human rights activists generally agree that the most
viable legal strategy by which AIDS victims may seek compensation from
former employers who allegedly discriminate against AIDS victims is to
assert that AIDS is a handicap and that state and federal laws prohibit
12. See Tanne, AIDS: Is Anyone Safe? READER'S DIGEsT, Feb. 1986, at 60, 60 (noting
that public attention focuses on fear of casual contact with AIDS victims). In LaRocca v.
Daisheim, the Supreme Court for Dutchess County, New York, noted the appearance of hot
lines, crisis centers, medical advisory boards, and informational newsletters for homosexuals to
attempt to alleviate the public's anxiety regarding AIDS. LaRocca v. Dalsheim, 120 Misc.2d
697, 699, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302, 304 (1983).
13. See Amiel, AIDS and the Rights of the Well, MACLEAN'S, Sept. 30, 1985, at II
(noting forms of discrimination against AIDS victims). Public anxiety regarding AIDS results
in many forms of discrimination against AIDS victims. See Approach to Victims of AIDS
Becoming Discrimination Issue, 57 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) CC-I (March 25, 1985) (available
on LEXIS) (noting that AIDS has created variety of legal problems for AIDS victims and
members of high-risk groups). For example, many dentists refuse to treat AIDS patients, travel
agents often attempt to screen AIDS victims from travel tours, and firemen frequently refuse
to give mouth to mouth resuscitation to persons whom the firemen perceive as potential AIDS
victims. Amiel, AIDS and the Rights of the Well, MACLEAN'S, Sept. 30, 1985, at 11. In New
York City, apartment tenants sought to have a doctor evicted because he treated AIDS patients.
Approach to Victims of AIDS Becoming Discrimination Issue, 57 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) CC-
1 (March 25, 1985) (available on LEXIS). A New York court subsequently ruled in favor of
the doctor. Id.; see People v. 49 West 12 Tenants Corp., No 43604/83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
Oct. 17, 1983); see also infra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing employment discrimi-
nation against AIDS victims).
14. See generally Tarr, AIDS Victims Face Bias, Too, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 16, 1985, at 30,
col. 2 (noting growing number of complaints of alleged employment discrimination against
AIDS victims) [hereinafter cited as Victims Face Bias]. AIDS victims and those individuals
perceived as potential AIDS victims often face employment discrimination. Id. For example,
Columbia University refused to take back an employee who took a leave of absence because,
while on the leave of absence, doctors diagnosed the employee as having early symptoms of
AIDS. Blodgett, Et Al., STUDENT LAw., Jan. 1984, at 8. Similarly, an employer fired an
employee after the employee took a day off from work to see a doctor. Id. at 9. The employer
knew the employee was a homosexual and apparently assumed the employee saw the doctor
because the employee had contracted AIDS. Id. Similarly, United Airlines allegedly fired a
flight attendant because airline officials thought the attendant's swollen glands were a symptom
of AIDS. Id. at 8. Most AIDS discrimination cases never reach litigation because both the
employer and the employee generally are anxious to settle disputes out of court. AMERICAN
MANAGEMENT AssOCIATION, AIDS, THE WORdIPLACE ISSUE 10 (1985); Victims Face Bias, supra
at 30, col. 3. Employers often are willing to settle out of court with an employee with AIDS
once the employer learns more about AIDS. Victims Face Bias, supra at 30, col. 3. Moreover,
employees are willing to settle with their employers because the employee usually needs his
salary or continued medical insurance to pay for physician and hospital bills resulting from the
disease. Id.
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discrimination on the basis of a handicap.' 5 The assertion that a communi-
cable disease such as AIDS is a handicap under federal and state discrimi-
nation laws, however, may be difficult to support in light of the sparse case
law discussing discrimination based on an illness or contagious disease.'
6
In December 1985, the Florida Commission on Human Relations consid-
ered the issue of employment discrimination against AIDS victims in Shut-
tleworth v. Broward County Office of Budget and Management Policy.'
Shuttleworth is the first employment discrimination case brought under either
state or federal law in which an AIDS victim relied on the theory that AIDS
is a handicap under state discrimination laws.' 8 In its administrative deter-
15. See, e.g., Leonard, Employment Discrimination Against Persons with AIDS, 10 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 681, 689-96 (1985) (advancing theory that AIDS qualifies as handicap under
state and federal anti-discrimination laws); Approach to Victims of AIDS Becoming Discrimi-
nation Issue, 57 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) CC-I (March 25, 1985) (available on LEXIS) (same);
Focus is on Employment Issues at New York AIDS Conference, 1138 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP.
(BNA) 1613, 1614 (Nov. 11, 1985) (same); AIDS as Handicap, 120 LAB. RE.. REP. (BNA) 278
(Dec. 2, 1985) (same).
The federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (federal Act) prohibits employment discrimination
on the basis of a handicap. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796(i) (1982). The federal Act, however, only
applies to the employment practices of the federal government and of large contractors and
programs receiving federal financial assistance. Id. §§ 793, 794; see infra notes 25-37 and
accompanying text (discussing purpose and scope of federal Act). In addition, forty-four states
and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
a handicap in both the private and public sectors. See FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MANUAL, 8A LAB.
REL. REP. (BNA) at 451:102 to 451-107 (1985) (summarizing status of state laws prohibiting
employment discrimination). Five states prohibit handicap discrimination only in the public
sector. Id. Only Delaware has no legislation regarding handicap discrimination. Id. Some cities,
including Los Angeles and San Francisco, have enacted municipal statutes banning discrimina-
tion based on AIDS. See Los Angeles Law on AIDS Seen Working on Bias, 1155 GOV'T EMPL.
REL. REP. (BNA) 371 (March 17, 1985) (discussing success of Los Angeles statute prohibiting
discrimination based on AIDS); Ban on Discrimination Against AIDS Victims, 120 LAB. REL.
REP. 278 (Dec. 2, 1985) (discussing enactment of San Francisco legislation prohibiting discrim-
ination based on AIDS).
16. See Leonard, supra note 15 at 690 (AIDS patients may not assume applicability of
handicap laws to victims of AIDS and other communicable diseases). In three states, handicap
laws explicitly exclude coverage for individuals afflicted with communicable diseases. See GA.
CODE § 34-6A-3(b)(2) (1982) (statute does not prohibit rejection of applicant for employment
on basis of any communicable disease); KY. REV. STAT. § 207.140(2)(c) (1982) (statute does not
prohibit rejection of applicant for employment or housing on basis of any communicable
disease); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:3 (XIII) (1984) (physical or mental handicap means
handicap other than illness).
17. Shuttleworth v. Broward County Office of Budget and Management Policy, 242 DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) E-I (Dec. 17, 1985). In addition to initiating an action before the Florida
Commission on Human Relations (the Commission), Shuttleworth brought suit against Broward
County (the County) in the United States District Court for Southern Florida, alleging that
the County's dismissal of Shuttleworth because he had contracted AIDS violated § 504 of
the federal Act as well as Shuttleworth's constitutional rights to equal protection and due
process. AIDS-Based Discrimination Claim May Proceed in Federal Court, 1174 GOV'T EMPL.
REL. REP. (BNA) 1061, 1061 (Aug. 4, 1986). The court set a December 1986 trial date for the
§ 504 claim, which the court severed from the rest of the suit. Id.
18. See Firing of Employee with AIDS is Handicap Bias, Florida Agency Rules 242 DAILY
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mination in Shuttleworth, the Florida Commission on Human Relations
ruled that AIDS is a handicap and that the Florida Human Rights Act of
19779 protects AIDS victims from employment discrimination because of
their handicap.20 Furthermore, the Florida Commission concluded that an
employer's concern that an AIDS victim may infect co-workers and customers
does not justify the employer's action of dismissing an AIDS victim.2' While
the ruling of the Florida Commission on Human Relations in Shuttleworth
establishes a precedent for the State of Florida, 22 the case's precedential value
in courts outside of Florida is uncertain. 23 Of particular interest, in light of
the Shuttleworth decision, is whether AIDS would qualify as a handicap
under the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 .24
The purpose of the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (federal Act) is
to develop and implement coordinated vocational rehabilitation services for
handicapped individuals. 25 The federal Act contains three provisions to
LAB. REP. (BNA) A-6 (Dec. 17, 1985) (available on LEXIS) (noting that Shuttleworth is first
decision to consider whether AIDS is handicap) [hereinafter cited as Firing of Employee]; AIDS
as Handicap, 120 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 346, 346 (Jan. 23, 1985) (same); see Shutleworth, 242
DAILY LAB. REP. E-l (Dec. 17, 1985); see also notes 75-100 (discussing Shuttleworth).
19. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 760.01-760.37 (West 1985); see infra note 82 and accompanying
text (discussing Florida anti-discrimination statute).
20. See Shuttleworth, 242 DAILY LAB. REP. at E-I to E-2 (Florida Human Rights Act
protects AIDS victims from employment discrimination); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 760.01-
760.37 (West 1985) (Florida Discrimination in the Treatment of Persons statute).
21. Shuttleworth, 242 DAILY LAB. REP. at E-2; see infra notes 99-103 and accompanying
text (discussing risk of AIDS victim infecting co-workers as employer justification for dismissing
AIDS victim).
22. See Housing Auth. of the City of Sanford v. Billingslea, 464 So.2d 1221, 1224 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985). In Housing Authority of the City of Sanford v. Billingslea, the Florida
District Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit held that the Florida Human Rights Act grants
to the Commission on Human Relations at least concurrent jurisdiction with the Florida Circuit
Court to hear employment discrimination cases that involve county and municipal employers.
Id. The Commission's ruling in Shuttleworth, therefore, set a statewide precedent. See Firing
of Employee, supra note 18, at (discussing precedential value of Shuttleworth ruling for state
of Florida).
23. See Firing of Employee, supra note 18, at - (noting uncertainty of value of Shuttle-
worth ruling in jurisdictions outside of Florida).
24. See U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1982) (federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973); see also Shuttle-
worth, 242 DAILY LAB. REP. E-I (Dec. 17, 1985).
25. See 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1982). Although the purpose of the federal Act is to implement
coordinated vocational services for the handicapped, the federal Act is not a comprehensive
statute proscribing handicap discrimination in employment. Id. Congress approached the
problem of handicap discrimination in a piecemeal fashion. C. RICKEY, MANUAL ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS F3 (Federal Judicial Center,
Education and Training Series 1981). Other pertinent federal statutes include the Revenue
Sharing Act, which prohibits handicap discrimination by state and local agencies funded by
revenue sharing, and the Vietnam Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act, which requires federal
contractors and executive agencies to take affirmative action to hire disabled veterans. See 31
U.S.C. § 1242(a)(1) (Revenue Sharing Act); 38 U.S.C. §§ 2012, 2014 (1982 & Supp. 1985)
(Vietnam Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act).
1520 [Vol. 43:1515
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eliminate discrimination against handicapped persons whenever a nexus exists
between an employer and the federal government. 26 Section 501 of the federal
Act prohibits employment discrimination by the federal government against
handicapped federal employees and requires the federal government to take
affirmative action to hire handicapped individuals. 27 In addition, section 503
requires federal government contractors to take affirmative action to hire
qualified handicapped persons. 2 Finally, section 504 of the federal Act
proscribes handicap discrimination against otherwise qualified handicapped
individuals participating in any program receiving federal financial assistance
or any program conducted by the executive branch of the federal govern-
ment. 29 The scope of section 504 encompasses more than discrimination in
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793, 794 (1982); see infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text
(discussing §§ 501, 503, and 504 of federa[,Act, designed to eliminate handicap discrimination).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1982). Section 501 of the federal Act exclusively deals with
employment of federal employees and candidates for federal employment. Id. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is the only agency empowered to enforce § 501.
Id.; see C. RICKEY, supra note 25, at F[3] (discussing enforcement of § 501). Federal employees
must exhaust EEOC administrative remedies before bringing action under § 501 in federal court.
C. RICKEY, supra note 25, at Ff312; see 29 C.F.R. §§ 1613.12-1613.282 (1985) (EEOC regulations
for pursuing EEOC administrative remedies). Section 501 requires the federal government to
take affirmative action to hire and to accommodate handicapped individuals. 29 U.S.C. § 791;
see 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704 (regulations requiring affirmative action). An employer's reasonable
accommodation may include making facilities accessible to handicapped persons and modifying
work schedules. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1982). Section 503 of the federal Act provides that any contract for
the procurement of personal property or non-personal services for the United States in excess
of $2,500 to which any federal department or agency is a party must contain a clause requiring
the contractor to take affirmative action to employ handicapped individuals to perform the
contract. Id. Section 503 also applies to subcontractors who enter into contracts in excess of
$2,500 with prime contractors carrying out a contract with the federal government. Id. Section
503, like § 501, requires contractors with the federal government to take affirmative action to
hire and accommodate handicapped individuals. Id. Although the language of § 503 refers to
affirmative action, by implication, § 503 also prohibits discrimination when a handicapped
individual is fully qualified and does not require a contractor's assistance. See Rogers v. Frito-
Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1079 n.5 (5th Cir. 1980) (legislative history indicates § 503 has anti-
discrimination component); S. REP. No. 318 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (discussing prevention of
employment discrimination as one purpose of § 503), reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONrG. &
AD. NEws 2076. The United States Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compli-
ance Programs is responsible for the enforcement of § 503. 29 C.F.R. § 793 (1982).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). Because § 504 of the federal Act requires non-discrimination
by employers administering programs receiving federal financial aid, hospitals, universities,
states, and municipalities receiving federal grant funds are within the reach of § 504. J.
NORTHRUP, OLD AGE, HANDICAPPED AND VIETNAM-ERA ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION 78
(1977); see 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(f) (1985) (defining "recipient" to include any entity to which
federal government directly or indirectly extends financial assistance).
Some courts require a plaintiff bringing an employment discrimination suit under § 504 of
the federal Act also to establish that the primary objective of the financial assistance received
by the employer is to provide employment. See Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist.,
620 F.2d 672, 674-75 (8th Cir.) (purpose of federal financial aid received by employer must be
to provide employment), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 892 (1980); Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation
Center, 590 F.2d 87, 89 (4th Cir. 1978) (same), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947 (1979). These
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employment opportunities.3 0 Section 504, however, does not require federally
funded programs and activities conducted by an executive agency to take
affirmative action to hire handicapped individuals." Although the federal
Act provides handicapped individuals protection against employment discrim-
ination by a federally supported employer, the federal Act offers handicapped
individuals no protection from employment discrimination in the private
sector.1
2
To qualify for protection under the federal Act, an individual must
demonstrate that he satisfies the statutory definition of "handicapped indi-
vidual. ' 3 3 Section 501, 503, and 504 of the federal Act all rely on the same
definition of "handicapped individual. '34 The federal Act defines a handi-
capped individual as "any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities,
(ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such
an impairment. ' 3 Furthermore, an individual bringing an action under
section 503 or 504 also must demonstrate that he is an otherwise qualified
jurisdictions held that, because § 504 of the federal Act makes available to aggrieved individuals
the rights, remedies, and procedures of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 504 of the
federal Act incorporates by implication the requirement of § 604 of the Civil Rights Act that
the primary objective of the financial aid be employment. See Carmi, 620 F.2d at 674-75 (§ 504
of federal Act incorporates requirement of Civil Rights Act that primary purpose of federal
financial aid is to promote employment); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (Civil Rights Act requirement
that primary objective of federal financial assistance is to provide employment). The United
States Supreme Court in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, however, held that Congress did
not intend to incorporate the primary objective requirement of § 604 of the Civil Rights Act
into the federal Act. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 635 (1984). The
Supreme Court reasoned that it would be anomalous to conclude that Congress intended to
limit an act designed to enhance a handicapped individual's right to sue employers receiving
federal funding. Id.
30. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982); see C. RICKEY, supra note 23, at Fl (discussing scope of
§ 504).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
32. See Comment, Employment Discrimination-Analyzing Handicap Discrimination
Claims: The Right Tools for the Job, 62 N.C. L. REV. 535, 539 (1984) (federal Act provides
no protection to private sector employees).
33. See 29 U.S.C. §706(7)(B) (1982) (definition of "handicapped individual").
34. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793, 794 (1982); see 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (definition of "handi-
capped individual").
35. 29 U.S.C. § 706(B) (1982). Regulations implementing the federal Act provide guidance
for interpreting the terms used in the federal Act's definition of "handicapped individual." See
41 C.F.R. § 60-741 Appendix A (1985) (defining terms found in federal Act's definition of
"handicapped individual"); 29 U.S.C. § 706(B) (definition of "handicapped individual").
"Major life activities" include communication, ambulation, selfcare, socialization, education,
vocational training, employment, transportation, and adapting to housing. 41 C.F.R. § 60-471
Appendix A. A "substantially limited" handicapped individual is one who is likely to experience
difficulty in securing retraining or advancement in employment. Id. Individuals having a "record
of an impairment" include those who have recovered from a previous impairment and those
who employers erroneously may classify as having an impairment. Id. An individual "regarded
as having an impairment" is a person who others perceive as having a handicap, whether or
not that individual is, in fact, handicapped. Id.
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individual who meets all job requirements.16 If the individual's handicap
prevents him from satisfactorily performing a job, the federal Act does not
protect the individual.1
7
Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case by showing that he is
handicapped, that he is an otherwise qualified handicapped individual, and
that his employer discriminated against him, the burden shifts to the employer
to rebut the presumption of illegality. 8 The employer may attack the plaintiff's
prima facie case by presenting evidence that the employee's impairment is
not a handicap under the federal Act or, in section 503 or 504 suits, that
the employee's handicap substantially interferes with the employee's ability
to perform at work and, therefore, that the employee is not otherwise
qualified.39 Alternatively, an employer may establish an affirmative defense
36. 29 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794 (1982); see Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442
U.S. 397, 406 (1979). In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, the United States Supreme
Court held that an otherwise qualified person is "one who is able to meet all of a program's
requirements in spite of his handicap." Id.
37. See Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d at 676 (employee who
cannot perform job responsibilities receives no protection from § 504 of the federal Act). Only
handicapped persons capable of performing a job with reasonable accommodation receive the
protection of §§ 503 and 504 of the federal Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794 (1982). In Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, the Supreme Court noted that technological advances may qualify
some handicapped individuals for employment without imposing undue financial and adminis-
trative burdens upon an employer. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,
412 (1979). In these situations, an employer's refusal to modify an existing program to
accommodate a handicapped individual may be unreasonable and discriminatory. Id. Employers,
however, have no obligation to effect substantial modification of employment standards to
accommodate handicapped individuals. Id. at 413.
38. See New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644, 649
(2d Cir. 1979). In New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, the Second
Circuit stated that a general principal of discrimination law requires that, once a plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, a defendant must present sufficient evidence to
rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case by showing that the employer dismissed the plaintiff for a
nondiscriminatory reason. Id. To establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination in an
employment discrimination dispute, a plaintiff must show that he had a handicap, that he
otherwise meets the qualifications for the position, and that the employer rejected him for the
position. School Bd. of Pinellas County v. Rateau, 449 So.2d 839, 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984). The burden of proving an inability to accommodate a handicapped individual is on the
employer. Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 308 (5th Cir. 1981). The
allocation of the burden of proof in actions arising out of the federal Act parallels the allocation
of the burden of proof in Title VII cases. Rateau, 449 So.2d at 841. In McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, the United States Supreme Court noted that, in a complaint under Title VII
charging racial employment discrimination, a complainant has the burden of establishing a
prima facie case by showing that he belongs to a racial minority, that he applied and was
qualified for the position, and that the employer continued to seek applicants for the position.
McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The burden of proof in Title VII cases
then shifts to the employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting the applicant.
Id. The applicant then must show that the justification for rejection articulated by the employer
is pretextual. Id. at 804.
39. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text (discussing definition of "handicapped
individual); supra notes 36 and 37 and accompanying text (discussing §§ 503 and 504 requirement
that handicapped individual be "otherwise qualified").
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or a justification for his decision to dismiss an employee.4 0 If, for example,
an employer establishes that a plaintiff's presence at work presents a health
or safety risk to other employees or customers of the employer, the affirm-
ative defense or justification for dismissal may prevail, and the court may
determine that the employer did not dismiss illegally the plaintiff.4'
Under the federal Act, an AIDS victim charging an employer with
unlawful discrimination based on a handicap must establish as part of his
prima facie case that a contagious disease such as AIDS is a protected
handicap.4 2 In addition, a plaintiff must show that he otherwise meets the
qualifications for the position and that an employer rejected him for the
position.4 3 Finally, an AIDS victim relying on the theory that AIDS is a
handicap under the federal Act must rebut an employer's probable affirma-
tive defense that the presence of an AIDS patient at work presents a
significant risk of infection to co-workers and customers."
While no court has considered directly whether AIDS qualifies as a
handicap under the federal Act, 5 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit has addressed whether a contagious disease falls within
the coverage of the federal Act. 46 In Arline v. School Board of Nassau
County,47 the Eleventh Circuit considered whether tuberculosis, a chronic
contagious disease, 48 is a handicap within the coverage of the federal Act.
4 9
40. See New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644, 650
(2d Cir. 1979) (employer must make at least some substantial showing justifying employer's
action); McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (same).
41. See Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859, 861-63 (7th Cir. 1974) (court
may consider safety of bus passengers and highway motorists in determining validity of
employer's dismissal of bus driver in employment discrimination case brought by bus driver),
cert. denied, sub nom. Brennan v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 419 U.S. 1122 (1975); Usery v.
Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236-38 (5th Cir. 1976) (courts may consider safety of
third parties when determining validity of employer's dismissal of employee in employment
discrimination case brought by employee). See generally Leonard, supra note 15, at 697
(employer's affirmative defenses focusing oo safety issues in workplace may prevail in employ-
ment discrimination cases).
42. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (plaintiff must establish, as part of prima
facie case, that impairment satisfies federal Act's definition of handicap). See 29 U.S.C.
§706(7)(B) (1982) (definition of "handicapped individual").
43. See id. (plaintiff must establish that he is otherwise qualified for position).
44. See Leonard, supra note 15, at 697 (foremost employer affirmative defense in AIDS
case is fear of contagion); supra notes 40 and 41 and accompanying text (employer may assert
affirmative defense based on health and safety issues).
45. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text (no court has considered whether AIDS
is handicap under federal Act).
46. See Arline v. School Bd. of Nassau County, 772 F.2d 759, 763-64 (lth Cir. 1985)
(considering whether contagious disease constitutes handicap within meaning of federal Act),
cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1633 (1986).
47. 772 F.2d 759 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3695 (1986).
48. See 4 J. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEY's DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE T-157 (1984). Tuberculosis
is a contagious disease caused by infection with the bacteria Mycobacterium tuberculosis. Id.
Tuberculosis most frequently affects the lungs, although the disease also may affect bone,
lymph nodes, and other tissue. Id. The disease spreads primarily by contact with saliva and
sputum ejected from the lungs of the infected persons. Id.
49. Arline, 772 F.2d at 764.
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In Arline, the School Board of Nassau County, Florida (School Board) had
dismissed the plaintiff, Arline, from her position as a third grade school
teacher solely because of her susceptibility to tuberculosis. 0 Arline first had
contracted tuberculosis in 1957, after which the disease went into remission.5'
The School Board hired Arline as a school teacher in 1966.52 Arline subse-
quently suffered three relapses of tuberculosis between 1977 and 1978.- 3 The
School Board dismissed Arline after her third relapse in 1978. 54 After attempts
to obtain relief in state administrative proceedings had failed, Arline brought
suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida,
alleging that her dismissal by the School Board violated section 504 of the
federal Act.5 Arline contended that tuberculosis is a handicap within the
meaning of the federal Act and that the School Board had violated the
federal Act because the School Board had fired Arline as a result of her
handicap, even though Arline was otherwise qualified to perform her job.
5 6
Arline asserted that the risk of Arline infecting her students was so minimal
that her handicap posed no obstacle to her continued employment and that
the School Board's decision to fire Arline because pf her handicap, therefore,
was unreasonable and discriminatory.57 In the alternative, Arline contended
that, even if nonsusceptibility to tuberculosis is a necessary physical require-
ment for teaching young children, the School Board should have offered
Arline reasonable accommodation in the form of another job within the
School District. 8
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida issued
an oral opinion in Arline and found for the School Board. 9 The district
court ruled that a contagious disease such as tuberculosis is not a handicap
under the federal ActA° The district court found unpersuasive the argument
50. Id. at 760. In Arline v. School Board of Nassau County, the Nassau County School
Board (School Board) hired Arline as an elementary school teacher in 1966. Id. The School





55. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 794 (no program receiving federal financial assistance shall
discriminate against otherwise qualified handicapped individual). In Arline v. School Board of
Nassau County, the Eleventh Circuit noted that Arline had at least two hearings before the
School Board, one hearing before the Board of Education, and one hearing before the State
Board of Education. Arline, 772 F.2d at 760 n.3. The district court rejected Arline's clian that
the School Board violated her right of due process. Id. at 760-61 n.3.
56. Arline, 772 F.2d at 760-61; see 29 U.S.C. § 791 (no employer receiving federal
financial assistance shall discriminate against otherwise qualified handicapped individual).
57. Arline, 772 F.2d at 761.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id. In addition to finding that tuberculosis is not a handicap covered by the
federal Act, the district court in Arline also concluded that the School Board did not receive
federal financial assistance within the meaning of § 504 and, therefore, Arline did not meet the
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that Congress had intended to include contagious diseases within the defini-
tion of handicap. 6' The district court ruled that, in any event, the School
Board had an overriding duty to protect the public from contagious diseases
and that this public duty justified Arline's dismissal. 62 In the view of the
district court, the School Board, therefore, had no obligation to provide
Arline an alternative position within the School District.63 Arline appealed
the decision of the district court to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit.64
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's determination that a
contagious disease is not a handicap within the meaning of the federal Act.63
In considering Arline's claim, the Eleventh Circuit construed the meaning of
"handicapped individual," "otherwise qualified," and "federal financial
assistance" in section 504 of the federal Act.6 The Eleventh Circuit noted
that the language of the statute and the implementing regulations promul-
gated by the United States Department of Health and Human Services
support in every respect a conclusion that individuals with contagious diseases
are "handicapped individuals" within the coverage of the federal Act. 67 The
requirements of § 504. See id. at 762. The Nassau County school system received federal funds
designed to assist school systems attended by significant numbers of children from low income
families as well as federal impact aid. Id. at 762; see 20 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3876 (1982 & Supp.
1986) (Financial Assistance to Meet Special Educational Needs of Disadvantaged Children); 20
U.S.C. §§ 238-241 (Assistance for Local Educational Agencies Affected by Federal Activity).
The district court concluded that Arline was not a beneficiary of the funds earmarked for
children from low income families because she did not teach children from low income families.
Arline, 772 F.2d at 761. Furthermore, the district court held that federal "impact aid" received
by the School Board is more analogous to land taxes than to federal assistance. See id. The
federal government provides impact aid to school systems whose enrollment increases substan-
tially as a result of the attendance of the children of federal employees, but whose tax revenues
decrease as a result of federally owned property within the district. See id. at 761.
61. See id.; supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text (discussing definition of handicap
under federal Act).
62. See Arline, 772 F.2d at 761.
63. See id. at 765. In Arline v. School Board of Nassau County, the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida made no findings regarding the cost to the School
Board of accommodating Arline in a new position. Id. The district court concluded merely that
the School Board's overriding duty to protect the public from contagious diseases precluded the
School Board from considering the risks involved in accommodating Arline in a different
position. Id. The district court did not make clear whether its decision that the School Board
had no obligation to accommodate Arline rested on a finding that tuberculosis is not a handicap,
or that Arline was not otherwise qualified for any teaching position because of her susceptibility
to tuberculosis, or that reasonable accommodation did not include the requested relief. Id. at
761 n.7.
64. Id. at 760.
65. Id. at 764.
66. Arline, 772 F.2d at 760; see 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) (no person receiving federal
financial assistance shall discriminate against otherwise qualified handicapped individual).
67. See Arline, 772 F.2d at 764 (persons with contagious diseases are handicapped within
meaning of federal Act); see also 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982) (definition of "handicapped
individual"); 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(2) (1985) (providing definitions for significant terms used in
federal Act's definition of "handicapped individual"). In Arline v. School Board of Nassau
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Eleventh Circuit found no evidence to indicate that Congress intended to
exclude contagious diseases from the statutory definition of handicapped
individual. 68 The Eleventh Circuit observed that a person with tuberculosis
"has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits.. .major
life activities" because tuberculosis can impair significantly respiratory func-
tions and other major body systems. 69 The Eleventh Circuit noted that, even
when Arline's tuberculosis is in remission, Arline met the statutory definition
of a handicapped person because Arline has a record of an impairment of a
major life activity and because the School Board regarded Arline as having
such an impairment. 70 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that regarding tuber-
culosis as a handicap under the federal Act promotes Congress' intent to
prohibit unnecessary discrimination'.7 The Eleventh Circuit noted, however,
that section 504 of the federal Act proscribes discrimination only when a
handicapped individual is "otherwise qualified" for the job when given
"reasonable accommodation. ' 72 The Eleventh Circuit, therefore, remanded
the case to the district court to determine whether the risk of Arline
transmitting the disease to her students precluded Arline from being otherwise
qualified for her job, and, if so, whether it was possible for the School
Board to accommodate Arline in another position. 73 The Eleventh Circuit
further directed the district court to review carefully the evidence before
determining whether the School Board's affirmative defense that the School
Board had dismissed Arline to protect students from a contagious disease
reflected a decision based on an objective weighing of risks and alternatives.7 4
County, the Eleventh Circuit noted that Congress explicitly had excluded alcoholism and drug
abuse from the definition of handicap. Arline, 772 F.2d at 764; see 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B)
(definition of handicapped individuals excludes alcoholism and drug abuse). For purposes of §§
503 and 504 of the federal Act, the definition of a handicapped individual does not include a
person whose current use of drugs or alcohol prevents him from performing his job or presents
a threat to the safety or property of others. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B). The Eleventh Circuit
concluded that Congress' failure explicitly to exclude contagious diseases from the definition of
handicap indicates that Congress did not disapprove of considering contagious diseases as
handicaps. Arline, 772 F.2d at 764.
68. Arline, 772 F.2d at 764; see 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1982) (purpose of federal Act is to
implement coordinated vocational services for handicapped individuals).
69. Arline, 772 F.2d at 764.
70. Id.
71. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1982) (purpose of federal Act is to implement coordinated
vocational services for handicapped individuals); supra notes 25 & 26 and accompanying text
(discussing purpose of federal Act). In Arline, the Eleventh Circuit noted that, to prevent
unnecessary discrimination, a court must weigh all the evidence before determining whether an
employer's decision to refuse to hire or to dismiss a handicapped individual is a well informed
judgment. Arline, 772 F.2d at 764-65.
72. Arline, 772 F.2d at 765; see 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) (proscribing discrimination when
otherwise qualified handicapped individual given reasonable accommodation); see also supra
note 28 and accompanying text (discussing requirement under federal Act that handicapped
individual be otherwise qualified for job).
73. Arline, 772 F.2d at 765.
74. Id. at 764-65.
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While the Eleventh Circuit in Arline accepted the argument that a
contagious disease such as tuberculosis is a handicap under the federal Act,
7
no state or federal court or agency has addressed whether the contagious
disease of AIDS is a handicap under the federal Act.76 The Florida Com-
mission on Human Relations, in its administrative determination in Shuttle-
worth v. Broward County Office of Budget and Management Policy,
77
however, provided the rationale to extend the Eleventh Circuit's acceptance
of a contagious disease as a protected handicap to provide relief under the
federal Act to AIDS victims.78 In Shuttleworth, the Broward County, Florida
Office of Budget and Management Policy (County) had employed Shuttle-
worth as a policy analyst from May 1983 until September 1984.79 The County
had fired Shuttleworth in September 1984 because the County had learned
that Shuttleworth had contracted AIDS and because, in the County's view,
medical evidence regarding the severity and communicability of AIDS was
incomplete. 0 The County maintained that dismissing Shuttleworth was the
only means to protect Shuttleworth from contagious infections carried by
other employees in the office and to safeguard Shuttleworth's co-workers
from the AIDS virus and any contagious infections associated with the AIDS
virus carried by Shuttleworth. 2 Shuttleworth subsequently filed a complaint
of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Com-
mission), alleging that the County had discriminated against him on the basis
of his handicap, AIDS, in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act of
1977 (Florida Act). 82
75. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text (discussing Eleventh Circuit's conclusion
in Arline that contagious diseases are handicaps); see also 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982) (definition
of handicapped individual).
76. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (noting that no court has considered
classifying AIDS as handicap under federal Act).
77. 242 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) E-l (Dec. 17, 1985).
78. Id.; see infra notes 104-27 and accompanying text (discussing rationale to extend
handicap coverage under federal Act to AIDS victims).
79. Shuftleworth, 242 DAILY LAB. REP. at E-1.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.; see FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 760.01-760.37 (West 1985) (Florida Human Rights Act
of 1977). The general purpose of the Florida Human Rights Act of 1977 (Florida Act) is to
prevent discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap,
or marital status. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.01(2). The function of the Florida Commission on
Human Relations (Commission) is to promote the goals of the Florida Act. Id. § 760.05. The
Florida legislature provided the Commission with the power to act upon complaints alleging
discriminatory practices. Id. § 760.06(5). Any aggrieved person or the Attorney General may
file a complaint alleging a discriminatory employment practice. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 22T-9.01(1)
(1982). The Office of Field Services investigates the complaint and prepares a report, with a
recommendation of appropriate action to the Office of General Counsel. Id. §§ 22T-9.03(l),
22T-9.04(l). After reviewing the report from the Office of Field Services, the Office of General
Counsel makes a recommendation to the Executive Director of the Commission regarding
whether reasonable cause exists to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred.
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In his complaint, Shuttleworth contended that AIDS is a handicap under
the Florida Act and that contact typically occurring in the workplace does
not transmit the disease."' Furthermore, Shuttleworth asserted, and the
County did not dispute, that Shuttleworth's handicap did not affect his job
performance.8 4 Shuttleworth alleged, therefore, that the County unlawfully
discriminated against Shuttleworth on the basis of his handicap.85 The County
disputed Shuttleworth's contention that AIDS is a handicap and asserted
that, in any event, unresolved medical questions regarding the severity and
communicability of the disease justified the County's action. 6 Moreover, the
County defended its decision to fire Shuttleworth by asserting that the
County cannot assume the risk of allowing even one person unwittingly to
contract AIDS as a result of Shuttleworth's continued employment. 7 In
determining that the potential risks to other employees justified Shuttle-
worth's dismissal, the County relied on medical information contained in an
article prepared by the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services (Florida Department of Health).88
Id. § 22T-9.01(l). After the Executive Director makes a determination, the Clerk of the
Commission issues a notice of determination to the parties. Id. § 22T-9.04(2). If the Clerk
issues a Notice of No Reasonable Cause, the complainant may file with the Commission a
petition for redetermination of the allegation. Id. § 22T-9.04(4) (1982 & Supp. 1984). If the
Clerk issues a Notice of Determination of Reasonable Cause, on the other hand, an invitation
to the parties to participate in conciliation will accompany the Notice. Id. § 22T-9.04(3) (1982).
A duly executed conciliation agreement operates as a dismissal of the compliant. Id. § 22T-
9.04(3). If the parties fail to reach conciliation, a complainant may file a petition for relief
from an unlawful employment practice within 30 days of service of a notice of failure of
conciliation. Id. § 22T-9.08(l) (1982 & Supp. 1984). Upon consideration of a recommended
order prepared by a hearing officer, the Commission may dismiss the petition and complaint
or determine that the employer committed an unlawful employment practice. Id. § 22T-9.08(7).
If the Commission determines that an unlawful employment practice has occurred, the Com-
mission issues an order prohibiting the practice and providing relief from the effects of the
practice. Id.
83. Shuttleworth, 242 DAILY LAB. REP. at E-1; see FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 760.01-760.37
(West 1985) (Florida Act proscribing discrimination).




88. Id. at E-2 (discussing document prepared by Florida Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services (Florida Department of Health) regarding precautions for health care
workers to observe while treating AIDS patients). The Florida Department of Health had
prepared a document entitled AIDS-Information and Procedural Guidelines for Providing
Health and Social Services to Persons with AIDS, July 1984. Id. at E-1. The Florida Department
of Health prepared the document to advise hospitals concerning recommended procedures for
the treatment of patients with AIDS and hospital employees with AIDS. Id. at E-3. The
Department of Health advised hospitals to treat AIDS patients in routine hospital settings. Id.
The Department of Health also advised hospital administrators to evaluate hospital employees
with AIDS on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the employee should remain in a
patient care position. Id. at E-2. The Department of Health noted that the hospital administra-
tion should base its decision regarding job placement of an employee with AIDS on whether
the employee is free from easily transmissible infections and is not unduly susceptible to
infections. Id.
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In upholding Shuttleworth's claim of employment discrimination, the
Commission determined that AIDS is a handicap within the scope of the
Florida Act.8 9 Noting that the Florida Act does not define the term "hand-
icap," the Commission looked to the plain meaning of the word.9 Turning
to the dictionary definition of handicap, and recalling the Commission's
interpretation of the term in prior cases, the Commission concluded that,
under the Florida Act, a handicapped individual is one who "does not enjoy,
in some manner, the full and normal use of his sensory, mental or physical
faculties." 9' The Commission reasoned that, in light of the medical evidence
presented by Shuttleworth indicating that AIDS victims lose their natural
immunity to diseases, AIDS is a handicap within the coverage of the Florida
Act.92
In addition to concluding that AIDS is a handicap under the Florida
Act, the Commission implied that AIDS may fall within the definition of
handicap under the federal Act. 93 The Commission's construction of the
definition of handicap under the Florida Act is similar to the definition of
handicap under the federal Act.94 Furthermore, the Commission acknowl-
edged the similarity of its ruling that an AIDS patient is a handicapped
individual under the Florida Act and the Eighth Circuit's decision in Arline
that an individual with the chronic contagious disease of tuberculosis is a
handicapped individual under the federal Act.
95
89. Id. at E-1.
90. Id.
91. Id. In Shuttleworth, the Commission noted that, in construing similar statutes of
three other states, other states have resorted to the definition of "handicap" found in Webster's
Third International Dictionary. Id.; see State v. Turner, 3 Ohio App. 2d 5, 7-8, 209 N.E.2d
475, 477 (1965) (relying on dictionary definition of handicap in child neglect case); Chicago,
Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific R.R. Co. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 87
Wash.2d 802, 805, 557 P.2d 307, 310 (1976) (relying on dictionary definition of handicap in
employment discrimination case); Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific R.R. v. Department
of Indus. Labor and Human Relations, 62 Wis.2d 392, 398, 215 N.W.2d 443, 446 (1974) (same).
Webster's Third International Dictionary defines "handicap" as "a disadvantage that makes
achievement unusually difficult." WEBSTER'S THIRD INT'L DICTIONARY 1027 (1981). Webster's
definition of "handicap" is consistent with the Commission's interpretation of "handicap" in
prior cases. Shuttleworth, 242 DAILY LAB. REP. at E-1; see Fenesy v. GTE Data Servs., Inc.,
FCHR Case No. 79-214 (FCHR Aug. 11, 1981) (term "handicapped individual" construed by
Florida Commission to mean one who does not enjoy full and normal use of sensory, mental
or physical faculties).
92. Shuttleworth, 242 DAILY LAB. REP. at E-1.
93. Id.
94. Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982) (defining "handicapped individual" as one who has
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits major life activity).
95. See Shuttleworth, 242 DAILY LAB. REP. at E-1 (noting similarity of Arline and
Shuttleworth decisions). But see id. at E-5 (Investigatory Report). The Investigaroy Report
submitted to the Commission by the Office of Field Services prior to the Commission's
determination in Shuttleworth examined in greater depth than the Commission's determination
in Shuttleworth the County's argument that AIDS is not a handicap under the Florida Act. See
id. at E-2 (Investigatory Report). The County had noted in its defense that the Fair Housing
Act, a separate section of the Florida Act unrelated to unfair employment practices, defines a
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After determining that AIDS is a handicap under the Florida Act, the
Commission noted that the Florida Act permits employers to make employ-
ment decisions based on a handicap only when the absence of the handicap
is a bona fide occupational qualification necessary to perform the job.9 6 In
interpreting the term "bona fide occupational qualification," the Commis-
sion relied on a prior Florida case in which the Florida District Court of
Appeal construed the term. 97 The Florida state court held that the principal
handicapped individual as a person who has "a physical impairment which substantially limits
one or more major life activities or ... has a record of having, or is regarded as having, such
physical impairment." Shuttleworth, 242 DAILY LAB. REP. at E-5; see FLA. STAT. ANN. §
760.22(5) (West 1985) (definition of handicap under Florida Fair Housing Act). In light of the
similar terms used in the definition of handicap appearing in the Florida Fair Housing Act,
which is identical to the federal Act's definition of handicapped individual, the County looked
to the regulations implementing the federal Act for examples of what constituted physical or
mental impairments. Shuttleworth, 242 DAILY LAB. REP. at E-5; see 29 C.F.R. § 32.3 (1985)
(definition of handicap under Department of Labor's regulations implementing the federal Act);
see also 29 U.S.C. § 706(l)(B) (1982) (federal Act's definition of handicapped individual). The
County contended that not one disease or condition listed in the regulations as an example of
a mental or physical impairment is classifiable as a contagious, infectious, or communicable
disease. Shuttleworth, 242 DAILY LAB. REP. at E-5; see 29 C.F.R. § 32.3 (definition of handicap
under regulations implementing § 504 of federal Act). The regulations list orthopedic, visual,
speech and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular distrophy, multiple sclerosis,
cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness, and drug addiction and
alcoholism as examples of physical or mental impairments. 29 C.F.R. § 32.3. But see 29 U.S.C.
§ 706(7)(B) (excluding from definition of handicapped individual alcoholics and drug abusers
who cannot perform job or who threaten safety or property or others).
In considering whether an AIDS victim qualifies as a handicapped individual under the
Florida Act, the Office of Field Services first determined that AIDS constitutes a physical
impairment based on regulations implementing the federal Act. See Shuttleworth, 242 DAILY
LAB. REP. at E-5. As the Office of Field Services notes, certain opportunistic infections and
cancers that are rare in healthy individuals commonly afflict AIDS victims as a result of a
patient's loss of natural immunity to these diseases. See id. The Office of Field Services
recommended to the Commission that AIDS qualifies as a physical impairment because the
disease renders its victim's immune system defenseless against opportunistic diseases. Id.
Shuttleworth's medical records indicated that he was suffering from a lymphatic condition and
cancer. Id. at E-5 to E-6. Both the lymphatic condition and the cancer impaired Shuttleworth's
physical faculties and, therefore, in the opinion of the Office of Field Services, Shuttleworth's
condition qualified as a physical impairment. See id. at E-6. Finally, the Office of Field Services
noted that, although Shuttleworth's physical impairment did not limit substantially major life
activities, the County treated the impairment as constituting such a limitation and that the
impairment is, therefore, a handicap. See id. The definition of "handicapped individual" in
both the federal Act and the Florida Fair Housing Act includes persons regarded as having a
physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 760.22(5) (definition of handicap under Florida Fair Housing Act); 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B)
(definition of "handicapped individual" under federal Act). But see infra note 110 and
accompanying text (discussing view that AIDS is a physical impairment that substantially limits
a major life activity).
96. Shuttleworth, 242 DAILY LAB. REP. at E-2.
97. Id.; see School Bd. of Pinellas County v. Rateau, 449 So.2d 839, 842 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984) (construing meaning of bona fide occupational qualification under Florida Act). In
School Board of Pinellas County v. Rateau, the School Board of Pinellas County, Florida (School
Board) appealed a final order of the Florida Commission on Human Relations, directing the
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issue in employment discrimination cases is whether an employee with a
handicap will be able to perform the duties of the job without substantial
risk of future injury to himself.95 Furthermore, to establish a bona fide
occupational qualification, an employer must have a reasonable basis for its
assessment of the risk of injury.99 The Commission ruled that the County
had failed to show that Shuttleworth's continued employment would result
in a substantial risk of future injury to Shuttleworth.' °° The Commission
found, therefore, that the County had failed to establish that Shuttleworth
did not meet a bona fide occupational requirement.' 0'
Finally, the Commission considered the County's defense that its action
was necessary to prevent the spread of AIDS to Shuttleworth's co-workers.
The Commission stated that the consensus of the medical community is that
intimate contact, as opposed to casual contact, is the mode of transmission
of the AIDS virus. 0 2 The Commission noted that the Florida Department of
Health advised persons in high risk groups to avoid any exposure to AIDS
victims with easily transmissible opportunistic diseases.103 The Commission
reasoned that, under the facts of this case, Shuttleworth posed no health
threat to his co-workers because Shuttleworth had no easily transmissible
School Board to cease and desist from discriminating against Rateau, a substitute school teacher.
School Bd. of Pinellas County v. Rateau, 449 So.2d 839, 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
Rateau's charge of unlawful discrimination resulted form the School Board's withdrawal of an
offer of a temporary teaching job because of Rateau's back condition. Id. at 840. The District
Court of Appeal of Florida for the First District explained that the principle issue was whether
Rateau, who admitted having a bad back, would be able to perform the duties of the teaching
position without substantial risk of further injury to his back. Id. at 842. The uncontradicted
evidence presented by the School Board was that the teaching position required frequent
bending, stooping, and lifting. Id. at 840, 842. The medical evidence indicated that Rateau
faced a substantial risk of further injuring his back if he assumed the teaching position requiring
frequent bending. Id. at 842. Rateau's testimony that he performed similar activities with no
adverse effects to his back did not weaken the School Board's position. Id. Because the medical
evidence indicated that Rateau faced a substantial risk of further injury to his back if he
assumed the teaching position, the district court revoked and remanded the case to the Florida
Commission on Human Relations for an entry of an order dismissing Rateau's petition. Id. at
843.
98. Rateau, 449 So.2d at 842.
99. Id.
100. Shuttleworth, 242 DAILY LAB. REP. at E-2.
101. Id.
102. Id. at E-1. In general, the medical community shares the conclusion reached by the
Florida Department of Health that AIDS does not spread by casual contact. See supra notes
10-12 and accompanying text (casual contact does not spread AIDS).
103. Shuttleworlh, 242 DAILY LAB. REP. at E-1. The Florida Department of Health advised
that persons receiving large-dose steroid drugs on a daily basis, persons with known immune-
deficiency diseases, persons receiving chemotherapy who have not achieved hematologic recov-
ery, persons receiving immunosuppressive medication, and persons who are pregnant should
avoid any exposure to AIDS patients. Id. The danger to persons in these high risk groups,
however, occurs only when they come into contact with AIDS patients with easily transmissible
opportunistic infections. Id. at E-I to E-2. Contact with AIDS victims who do not have
transmissible infections poses no danger to persons in high risk groups. Id.
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opportunistic infections at the time that the County fired Shuttleworth.' °
The Commission concluded that AIDS is a handicap under the Florida Act
and that the County had failed to substantiate legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for dismissing Shuttleworth.' °5 The Commission, therefore, deter-
mined that the Commission had reasonable cause to believe that the County
unlawfully discriminated against Shuttleworth by firing Shuttleworth because
he had contracted AIDS. ,o6
The Arline and Shuttleworth decisions together provide a foundation for
the prediction that an employer legally may not discriminate against an
employee with AIDS.'0 7 Arline provides the basis for the conclusion that,
under the federal Act, AIDS is a protected handicap,'08 while Shuttleworth
provides the analysis for the conclusion that, in many situations, no health
or safety justifications exist for an employer to reject an applicant or dismiss
an employee because the applicant or employee has AIDS. t°0 An AIDS victim
whose immune system becomes severely suppressed has a physical impairment
that limits the body's ability to fight infections, which is arguably a major
life activity."10 Furthermore, the Florida Commission's implication in Shut-
104. Id. at E-2. The report of the Office of Field Services noted that Shuttleworth's
medical records revealed that Shuttleworth was suffering form a lymphatic condition and
Karposi's sarcoma, a rare skin cancer, neither of which are easily transmissible. Id. at E-5 to
E-6.
105. Id.; see supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text (discussing Commission's analysis
and conclusions).
106. Shuttleworth, 242 DAILY LAB. REP. at E-2. Although the Commission in Shuttleworth
ruled that the County unlawfully discriminated against Shuttleworth because of his handicap,
AIDS, the Commission specifically refused to address discrimination issues regarding employees
with easily transmissible infections. Id. In addition, the Commission refrained from addressing
issues regarding an employer's duty to reassign or alter working conditions of AIDS victims.
Id. The County subsequently petitioned the Commission's Executive Director for a redetermi-
nation. Broward County, Fla., Tries Again for Panel's Backing on Dismissal, 21 DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA) A-3 (Jan. 31, 1986) (available on LEXIS). In addition to its original arguments,
the County planned to assert that the County fired Shuttleworth for fear that he would be
absent excessively as the disease progressed. Id. The Commission, however, reaffirmed its
decision that the County violated the Florida Act by dismissing Shuttleworth because he had
AIDS. Florida Human Relations Commission Reaffirms Decision on AIDS Victim, 24 GOV'T
EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 542 (April 21, 1986) (available on LEXIS).
107. See infra notes 108-27 and accompanying text (discussing possibility of concluding
that federal Act protects AIDS victims).
108. See infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text (discussing conclusion that AIDS meets
definition of handicap found in federal Act).
109. See infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text (discussing conclusion in Shuttleworth
that health and safety concerns do not justify employer's action in firing AIDS victim).
110. See Leonard, supra note 15, at 691 (advancing theory that AIDS is impairment that
substantially limits major life functions). Under the federal Act, a handicapped individual
includes a person who "has a physical impairment which substantially limits one or more of
such person's major life activities." 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982). "Major life activities" include
caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, and working. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.36)(2)(ii) (1985) (Department of Health and Human
Services' definition of major life activity for purpose of implementing § 504 of federal Act); 29
C.F.R. § 32.3 (Department of Labor's definition of major life activity for purposes of § 504
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tleworth that AIDS potentially is a handicap under the federal Act lends
some support to an AIDS victim's argument."' A court, in determining
whether AIDS is a federally protected handicap, therefore, reasonably could
conclude that AIDS is a handicap under the federal Act."'2
While Arline demonstrates that AIDS may fall within the definition of
handicap under the federal Act,"13 an AIDS victim seeking protection from
employment discrimination must rebut an employer's assertion that AIDS is
a contagious disease that requires an employer to take measures to prevent
the spread of the disease through contact in the workplace." 4 To an unin-
formed trier of fact, the most persuasive affirmative defense in an AIDS
case most likely is the fear that co-workers and customers will contract
AIDS." 5 While an AIDS victim may transmit to other employees opportun-
istic infections associated with AIDS, the primary concern of workers is the
risk of an AIDS victim or a carrier of the AIDS virus transmitting the AIDS
virus to others. 116 An informed understanding of the nature of the disease is
essential to the decision of a court wrestling with the socially sensitive issue
of the rights of AIDS victims and their co-workers." 7 The Shuttleworth
decision demonstrates that, after balancing the concerns of both parties,
courts may find unpersuasive an employer's asserted justification for firing
an employee with AIDS because of the possibility of infecting a co-worker
or customer." 8 In Shuttleworth, the Florida Commission recognized that the
present judgment of the medical community is that the transmission of the
AIDS virus does not occur as a result of casual contact typically occurring
of federal Act). While the immune function is not specifically listed as a major life activity, the
list of life functions noted in the regulations is not exhaustive. See Shuttleworth, 242 DAILY
LAB. REP. at E-5 (noting that list defining major life functions is not meant to be exhaustive);
Leonard, supra note 15, at 691 (same). A court, therefore, could conclude that the body's
ability to maintain health by fighting infections is a major life activity. See Leonard, supra note
15, at 691 (ability to preserve health is major life activity). But see supra note 92 and
accompanying text (noting Office of Field Services' implication in Shuttleworth that AIDS is
physical impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities).
11I. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (noting Commission's inference in
Shuttleworth that AIDS may be handicap under federal Act); see also Firing of Employee,
supra note 18, at - (noting that, although Shuttleworth decision is not controlling in other
jurisdictions, AIDS victims initiating employment discrimination cases against federally funded
employers still may rely on Shuttleworth decision).
112. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text (advancing argument that AIDS is
handicap under federal Act).
113. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text (discussing conclusion that Arline
supports contention that AIDS is handicap under federal Act).
114. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing probable employer affirmative
defense in AIDS cases).
115. See Leonard, supra note 15, at 697 (fear of contagion is employer's foremost
affirmative defense in AIDS cases).
116. See Shuttleworth, 242 DAILY LAB. REP. at E-I.
117. See Arline, 772 F.2d at 764-65.
118. See Shuttleworth, 242 DAILY LAB. REP. at E-2; supra notes 102-04 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Florida Commission's determination that risk of AIDS patient infecting
co-workers does not justify dismissal of AIDS patient).
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in the workplace. ' ' 9 The Florida Commission, therefore, concluded that
evidence indicating that there is no reasonable probability that AIDS may
spread by casual contact is more persuasive than an employer's defense that
AIDS may spread to co-workers under normal workplace conditions.'
20
In light of Arline and Shuttleworth, an AIDS victim bringing suit against
a federally supported employer for alleged employment discrimination rea-
sonably may rely on the federal Act for relief.'2' The conclusion that AIDS
falls within the federal Act's definition of handicap, however, does not end
the inquiry of whether an employer discriminated against an AIDS victim.
The federal Act acknowledges that not every handicapped individual is
capable of performing all aspects of a particular job.' 22 An AIDS victim,
therefore, must be capable of performing all job requirements in spite of the
AIDS handicap.'2 3 This determination is a fact specific issue, unique to each
individual case. 24 For example, AIDS patients who have contracted several
opportunistic diseases, requiring hospitalization, most likely will be incapable
of continuing work.' 25 On the other hand, those individuals perceived as
potential AIDS victims merely because they are members of a high risk
group, or because they associate with AIDS victims, are more likely physically
capable of performing job requirements. 26 Therefore, in light of the Arline
and Shuttleworth decisions, an AIDS victim who is capable of performing
all job requirements reasonably may look to the federal Act for protection
against discrimination by a federally supported employer.'
27
DEBORAH LEE TITUS
119. Shuttleworth, 242 DAILY LAB. REP. at E-2; see supra notes 10-12 and accompanying
text (transmission of AIDS does not occur through casual contact). In a move to allay the
public's fear of contracting AIDS through casual contact, the United States Public Health
Service has advised that employers have no reason to exclude AIDS victims from the workplace.
AIDS: No Need for Worry in the Workplace, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 25, 1985, at 51. The Public
Health Service has recommended against instituting routine programs to screen for the AIDS
virus in the health care, personal service, and food service professions. Id.
120. Shuttleworth, 242 DAILY LAB. REP. at E-2.
121. Arline, 772 F.2d 759; Shuttleworth, 242 DAILY LAB. REP. E-1; see infra notes 122-27
and accompanying text (discussing conclusion that AIDS victim may rely on federal Act for
protection against handicap employment discrimination).
122. See Arline, 772 F.2d at 764 (law recognizes that not all handicapped individuals can
function in all aspects of society).
123. See Southeastern Community College, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979) (otherwise qualified
person is one who meets all program requirements in spite of handicap).
124. See Arline, 772 F.2d at 764 (issue of whether handicapped individual is otherwise
qualified is fact specific issue); School Bd. of Pinellas County v. Rateau, 449 So.2d 839, 842
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (same).
125. Leonard, supra note 15, at 687.
126. Id.; see supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing groups which are at higher
risk of contracting AIDS).
127. Arline, 772 F.2d 759; Shuttleworth, 242 DAILY LAB. REP. E-I; see supra notes 107-20
and accompanying text (discussing contention that AIDS victims may rely on federal Act for
protection against employment discrimination); supra note 71 (purpose of federal Act is to
prevent unnecessary discrimination).
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